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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of scientific evidence in criminal prosecutions has increased signifi-
cantly. The number of crime laboratories has tripled in the last two decades.' New
scientific procedures are introduced in evidence every year. Neutron activation
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analysis, 2 atomic absorption, 3 scanning electron microscopy, 4 and trace metal
detection5 are but a few of the techniques now used in criminal prosecutions. 6 A survey
of lawyers and judges revealed that "[t]hree quarters of the responders indicated about
1/3 of their cases utilized scientific evidence.'' 7 More important, however, is the
impact of this type of evidence. One study, which surveyed jury attitudes, observed:
"About one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with
scientific evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have
changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty. "8
Frequently, the most expedient way to introduce scientific evidence at trial is
through the admission of a laboratory report. 9 The results of drug analyses, 10
fingerprint examinations," t intoxication tests,12 rape victim examinations,13 and
various other scientific techniques 14 have been admitted in this fashion. Similarly,
2. E.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 435-41 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State
v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 419-22, 260 A.2d 547, 549-61 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See
generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Neutron Activation Analysis, 50 A.L.R.3d 117 (1973); Comment, The
Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CALiF. L. REv. 997 (1971).
3. E.g., Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1977); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 38-40, 383
A.2d 440, 441-42 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 326-28, 255 S.E.2d 373, 381-82 (1979); State v.
McCall, 698 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). See generally Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances
by Instrumental Analysis, in 22 Am. Jut. PROOF OF FACTS 385, 476-87 (1969).
4. E.g., People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978). See generally Judd, Scanning
Electron Microscopy as Applied to Forensic Evidence Analysis, in PR~cnsiNO LAw INsmnruT, Scnsmnc AND E.FO'ERT
EvIDENcE 873 (2d ed. 1981).
5. E.g., Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 558-60, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1978); State v. Snyder, 190 N.J.
Super. 626, 631-33, 464 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (Law Div. 1983); State v. Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 5-6, 305 N.E.2d
497, 498 (1973); Brotherton v. State, 666 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex. App. 1983). See generally Stevens & Messier,
Trace Metal Detection Technique, in PRAcnstNG LAw INmsrrrurm, Scsmrtc AND EXPERT EvmoNcE 1075 (2d ed. 1981).
6. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Haf-Century
Later, 80 COLum. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
7. 0. SctHoEDER, A LEGAL STUDy CONCERNING THE FoaRNsc ScENsc-s PERsoNNEL 19 (Assessment of the Forensic
Sciences Profession vol. 3, March 1977).
8. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 1, at 1748.
9. "Directors of crime laboratories estimate that their examiners testify in court in less than 10% of the cases they
examine. Consequently, it is principally the reports themselves which convey scientific information to various users in the
criminal justice system." Id.
10. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying substance as
cocaine); United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as heroin), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698,699 (7th Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance
as heroin). But see State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 224-25, 317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance
as marijuana excluded under federal and state constitution); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (lab
report identifying substances as LSD and marijuana excluded on constitutional grounds).
11. See United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232, 238-39, 15 C.M.R. 232, 238-39 (1954).
12. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1958) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 825 (1958); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397, 297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (report of breathalyzer test);
State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 381, 323 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1984) (affidavit of breath tests results). But see Moon v. State,
300 Md. 354, 368-73, 478 A.2d 695, 702-04 (1984) (admission of hospital report of blood alcohol test violated right
of confrontation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985).
13. E.g., Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on
vaginal smear); United States ex rel. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of rape
victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900, 900 (W.D. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying seminal fluid);
Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination); Commonwealth v. Franks,
359 Mass. 577, 580-81, 270 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (1971) (hospital report identifying sperm). But see Pickett v. Bowen,
798 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (1lth Cir. 1986) (medical report of sex abuse victim examination excluded on constitutional
grounds).
14. E.g., Hardy v. State, 53 Ala. App. 75, 78, 297 So. 2d 399, 402 (1974) (firearms identification report); State
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pathological findings have been introduced through autopsy reports. 15 Some of these
reports have been prepared by public agencies, such as police crime laboratories and
medical examiner offices. 16 Others have been prepared by private hospitals. 17 In
some cases, laboratory reports have been used to establish ultimate issues, such as the
identity of a controlled substance in a drug prosecution.' 8
The admissiblity of scientific reports raises a number of evidentiary issues.
Sometimes the report is used in conjunction with expert testimony, either to refresh
recollection 19 or as recorded recollection. 20 In either case, the expert is present in
court and subject to cross-examination on such matters as his qualifications, the
procedures employed, and the meaning of any conclusions reached. When the report
is used as a substitute for expert testimony, however, cross-examination is foreclosed
and important hearsay and confrontation issues are raised. 2'
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules) in 1975,
most federal courts admitted laboratory reports under either the public22 or business
records23 exceptions to the hearsay rule. State cases were in accord.2 4 In addition,
v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of examination of burglary debris); In re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d
1081, 1083-84, 374 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-86 (Fain. Ct. 1975) ("ballistics" report); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112,
121, 542 P.2d 782, 788 (1975) (lab report of blood test).
15. E.g., Grover v. State, 41 Md. App. 705, 710-11, 398 A.2d 528, 531 (1979); Burleson v. State, 585 S.W.2d
711, 712-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). But see Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d 653, 657
(1974) (autopsy report excluded under state constitution).
16. E.g., United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs laboratory), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 1957) (Bureau
of Narcotics laboratory); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970) (medical examiner's office).
17. E.g., Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying sperm on
vaginal smear); United States ex rel. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital record of rape
victim examination); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination).
18. See cases cited supra note 10.
19. E.g., United States v. Franklin, 747 F.2d 497,498 (8th Cir. 1984) (chemists refreshed recollection prior to trial
by reviewing reports prepared at the time cocaine tested). In this situation, however, the analyst's in-court testimony and
not the laboratory report is the evidence. The report may be introduced in evidence only by the adverse party and then
only for impeachment. See FED. R. Evio. 612.
20. E.g., United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1976) (report identifying substance as
cocaine admitted where chemist testified that he had analyzed the substance and correctly prepared the report but had no
independent recollection of the tests). See FED. R. EvIn. 803(5).
21. The admissibility of lab reports raises additional evidentiary issues. Because most laboratory reports in criminal
cases are prepared by government laboratories, they qualify as self-authenticating documents and thus may be admitted
without extrinsic evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 902; United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1982) ("A
laboratory report may also be admitted as an official record when it is accompanied by an authenticating certificate.").
The original writing ("best evidence") rule requires the production of the original document in order to prove the
content of a writing. FED. R. Evto. 1002. An exception, however, is typically recognized for public records, under which
certified copies of public records are admissible. FED. R. Evm. 1005. See also People v. Brown, 128 Misc. 2d 149, 152,
488 N.Y.S.2d 559, 563 (Co. Ct. 1985) ("Properly certified or authenticated copies of the test results are.., admissible
as copies of official records .... ").
22. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1958) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958). See generally Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory
Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASnsS L.J. 621 (1979).
23. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974) (lab report identifying substance as
cocaine); United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973) (lab report identifying substance as heroin), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981, 982 (3d Cir. 1972) (hospital lab report identifying
sperm on vaginal smear); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 1957) (lab report identifying substance as
heroin).
24. E.g., Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination admitted
as a business record); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. 1972) (lab report of examination of burglary debris
admitted as business record); State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 229, 541 P.2d 1204, 1209 (1975) (lab report identifying
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many courts had rejected confrontation challenges. 25 The advent of the Federal Rules
and their adoption by numerous states,2 6 however, has cast doubt on the earlier cases.
For example, a leading case, United States v. Oates,27 held a DEA chemist's report
inadmissible under the Federal Rules. 28 Moreover, the confrontation issue remains
clouded. As an American Bar Association study has noted, the constitutionality of
admitting "certain scientific reports in criminal cases" is an issue left open by the
Federal Rules. 29 The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, 30 and the Court's
recent confrontation cases do not point to a clear answer. The lower courts are
divided. 31
This Article examines the issues raised by the admissibility of prosecution
laboratory reports in lieu of expert testimony. Part II discusses the problems that arise
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part Il considers the constitutional question.
substance as marijuana admitted as public record); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 395, 297 A.2d 223, 225 (1972)
(report of breathalyzer test admitted as public record); In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 519, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001
(Faro. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance as heroin admitted as public and business records); People v. Porter,
46 A.D.2d 307, 311, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1974) (lab report of blood-alcohol test admitted as business record); State
v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 114-16, 542 P.2d 782, 784-85 (1975) (lab report of blood examination admitted as business
record).
But see State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 224, 317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as marijuana
does not qualify as a business record).
25. E.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1958) (certificate of blood alcohol test), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958); United States ex rel. Lurry v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 818, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (hospital
record of rape victim examination); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900, 900 (W.D. Va. 1970) (lab report identifying
seminal fluid); Henson v. State, 332 A.2d 773, 775 (Del. 1975) (hospital record of rape victim examination);
Commonwealth v. Franks, 359 Mass. 577, 580-81, 270 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (1971) (hospital report identifying sperm);
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 461-62, 253 N.E.2d 346, 351-52 (1969) (lab report identifying substance
as marijuana); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397, 297 A.2d 223, 226 (1972) (report of breathalyzer test results); In
re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 521-24, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004-07 (Fam. Ct. 1975) (lab report identifying substance
as heroin); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 62, 65, 175 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1970) (lab report identifying seminal
fluid); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 121, 542 P.2d 782, 788 (1975) (lab report of blood test).
But see State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 224-25, 317 A.2d 781, 782 (1974) (lab report identifying substance as
marijuana excluded under federal and state constitution); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 315-17, 322 A.2d
653, 657 (1974) (autopsy report excluded under state constitution).
26. Thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted rules of evidence patterned after the Federal Rules. See 1 J. XVEimmm
& M. BERGER, WmNEm's EvmrrscE T-1 (1986).
27. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
28. Id. at 84.
29. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. Sac. Lr. REP. 7.
30. In an early case, Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), the Court in dictum stated that an autopsy report
"could not have been admitted without the consent of the accused . . . because the accused was entitled to meet the
witnesses face to face." Id. at 450.
31. Courts finding a confrontation violation include: Pickett v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1986)
(medical report of sex abuse victim examination); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1290-92 (9th Cir. 1984)
(reports on the value of gems); Stevens v. Bordenkireher, 746 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) (death certificate); Stewart
v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 85 (6th Cir. 1976) ("ballistics" report); Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 368-73, 478 A.2d 695,
702-05 (1984) (hospital report of blood alcohol test); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (lab report
identifying substances as LSD and marijuana).
Courts rejecting a confrontation challenge include: United States v. Victor, 10 M.J. 69, 72 (C.M.A. 1980) (lab report
identifying substance as marijuana); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 838 (D.C. App. 1984) (lab report
identifying substance as heroin); Grover v. State, 41 Md. App. 705, 710-11,398 A.2d 528, 531 (1979) (autopsy report);
State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 381, 323 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1984) (affidavit of breath analysis test results); Burleson v.
State, 585 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (autopsy report).
The courts have consistently excluded psychiatric reports on confrontation grounds. See Kienlen v. United States,
437 F.2d 843, 848-49 (10th Cir. 1971); Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884
(1972); People v. Johnson, 11 I11. App. 3d 395, 401-02, 296 N.E.2d 763, 768 (1973); Gregory v. State, 40 Md. App.
297, 325, 391 A.2d 437, 454 (1978).
ADMISSIBILITY OF LABORATORY REPORTS
The principal focus of the Article is on reports prepared by police crime laboratories,
the type of report most commonly encountered in criminal prosecutions.
No matter how the issue is framed, the reliability of the report is the central
concern. The hearsay issue initially involves an inquiry into Congress' intent in
enacting the public and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. As applied to
laboratory reports, however, this intent is unclear. Thus, traditional analysis, which
focuses on the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, must be considered.
Similarly, the constitutional analysis turns on the reliability of these reports as well
as on the right of face-to-face confrontation. This Article concludes that reliability
concerns should preclude the admission of laboratory reports when offered by the
prosecution but proposes a procedure in Part IV by which these reports may be
admitted consistent with constitutional values.
I. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Federal Rule 803(8),32 which codifies the public records exception to the
hearsay rule, has been the principal obstacle to the admissibility of laboratory reports
in federal trials. The public records exception is supported by several rationales.
First, because of "the assumption that a public official will perform his duty
properly," 33 public records are considered reliable. Second, "the unlikelihood that
[the official] will remember details independently of the record" 34 makes reliance on
the record a necessity in many cases.
Although rule 803(8) was intended to facilitate the use of public records, its
application in criminal cases has spawned a number of problems. Initially, the
classification of different kinds of public records can sometimes be troublesome. The
rule recognizes three types of public records: (A) records relating to the activities of
the office, (B) records involving matters observed pursuant to a duty, and (C)
investigative reports. 35 The distinctions between these subdivisions are not precise 36
and thus there may be an "overlap.' 37 Because the limitations on admissibility differ
depending on the type of public record involved, it is sometimes critical to determine
which subdivision of the rule applies. 38 Courts have considered both subdivision (B)
and subdivision (C) when ruling on the admissibility of laboratory reports.
32. FED. R. EviD. 803(8) provides:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
33. FED. R. EviD. 803(8) advisory committee note.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 32.
36. See 4 D. Loism-t. & C. MnER, FEDERAL EvmiDEcF 724 (1980) ("[T]he three clauses simply do not create
watertight compartments.").
37. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]here may be no sharp demarcation between the
records covered by exception 8(B) and those referenced in exception 8(C) .... and indeed there may in some cases be
actual overlap .... ).
38. For example, classifying a record as a subdivision (A) record bypasses the criminal trial limitations codified
in subdivisions (B) and (C). See M. GRAHAMt, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EViDENCE 877 n.16 (2d ed. 1986) ("Instead of
attempting to place such a limitation upon Rule 803(8)(B), it is suggested that records of routine activities, not related to
19881
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A. Investigative Reports
Rule 803(8)(C) encompasses public records containing "factual findings result-
ing from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law." 39 The federal
drafters referred to such records as "evaluative reports. "40 In a leading case, United
States v. Oates,4 1 the Second Circuit stated that it "seems indisputable to us that the
chemist's official report and worksheet [identifying a substance as heroin] ... can be
characterized as [investigative] reports .... ,,42 As the rule explicitly provides,
investigative reports are not admissible in criminal cases when offered against the
accused; they are, however, admissible if offered against the prosecution. 43 Accord-
ing to the federal drafters, this result is required "in view of the almost certain
collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the
accused in a criminal case." 44
If accepted, the Oates position would be dispositive: Congress presumably
agreed with the confrontation analysis offered by the drafters, and laboratory reports,
as investigative reports, are therefore inadmissible. Oates, however, has been both
distinguished and criticized. Distinguishing Oates, the North Dakota Supreme Court
in State v. Manke45 held a laboratory report admissible under its version of rule
803(8)(C) where the analyst was present in court and subject to cross-examination. 46
In such a case, the court reasoned, confrontation rights are protected, and thus the
rationale for the limitation in criminal cases is inapplicable. 47 Since the chemist in
Oates was not present at trial,48 Manke is not necessarily inconsistent. More
importantly, the court's analysis is sound; the opportunity to cross-examine the expert
at trial eliminates the constitutional issue.
A far more serious challenge to Oates is based on a different reading of the
legislative history. In discussing Oates, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger have
written:
No legislative history indicates a Congressional intention to bar the admissibility of those
records which prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules had been admitted pursuant to the
business records exception. The Advisory Committee's intention was not to restrict
admissibility. ... 49
a specific investigation, like the recording of serial numbers, are properly included with Rule 803(A) as activities of the
office." (citations omitted)).
39. FED. R. Evso. 803(8)(C).
40. FED. R. Evi. 803(8) advisory committee note.
41. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 67. See also Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 54-55
(2d Cir. 1986) (fingerprint and handwriting reports admissible under rule 803(8)(C) in a civil case).
43. See generally Annotation, Admissibility Under Rule 803(8)(C) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of "Factual
Findings Resulting from Investigations Made Pursuant to Authority Granted by Law", 47 A.L.R. FED. 321 (1980).
44. FED. R. Evto. 803(8) advisory committee note.
45. 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982) (lab analyses of pillow and bed sheets in sex abuse prosecution).
46. Id. at 802-05.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. 4 J. Wem smtr. & M. BERGER, WENsme's EvmascE 803-264 (1987).
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As noted earlier, the prior federal cases generally had admitted laboratory reports. 50
Although the court in Oates believed that the prior cases were not dispositive, 51 the
issue remains debatable because laboratory reports were never mentioned in the
legislative history. 52
The conflict between Oates and the prior cases, however, may involve more
than an issue of congressional intent. The Oates court obviously viewed the
underlying chemical procedure as an "evaluative" process. In contrast, one of the
leading pre-Federal Rules cases viewed a blood alcohol test as involving "an
objective fact, not a mere expression of opinion.' 53 This latter characterization
suggests that rule 803(8)(C) may not apply; the rule governs only investigative or
evaluative reports, not the simple recording of objective facts. Hence, an appreciation
of the scientific procedure is as important as an understanding of the legal issues.
Indeed, as will be developed later in this Article, the scientific issue is the
determinative issue.
B. Matters Observed Pursuant to Duty: The Police Records Exclusion
Courts have also considered the admissibility of laboratory reports under rule
803(8)(B) - reports of matters observed and recorded pursuant to a legal duty. For
example, the court in Oates concluded that laboratory reports "might also be within
the ambit" of this provision, 54 a ruling that required the court to examine rule
803(8)(B)'s explicit exclusion of police records: "[I]n criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel" are inadmissible.
55
The police records exclusion did not appear in the rule as promulgated by the
Supreme Court.5 6 It was added by amendment from the floor of the House of
Representatives. 57 Several aspects of the legislative history are noteworthy. First,
confrontation concerns played a prominent role in the floor debates. The sponsor of
50. See cases cited supra notes 22-23.
51. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 74 n.31 (2d Cir. 1977) (Prior cases were decided before enactment of
Federal Rules and "before the recent wave of cases broadening the interpretation of the confrontation clause ... ").
52. See Alexander, The Hearsay Excepionfor Public Records in Federal Criminal Trials, 47 ALBANY L. REv. 699,
720 (1983) ("The problem with [the Oates] interpretation of rle 803(C) ... is that prior to adoption of the Federal Rule,
federal courts approved the admissibility of certain types of laboratory reports under the business records exception."
(footnote omitted)).
53. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
54. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 65 (2d Cir. 1977).
55. See generally Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 803(8)(B), Federal Rules of
Evidence, Excluding from Exception to Hearsay Rule in Criminal Cases Matters Observed by Law Enforcement Officers,
37 A.L.R. FED. 831 (1978).
56. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 301 (1973).
57. One problem caused by the amendments involves the admissibility of police records offered by the defense. On
its face, rule 803(8)(B) would appear to exclude all police records, whether offered by the prosecution or the defense. In
this respect, subdivision (B) differs from subdivision (C), which expressly excludes investigative reports in criminal eases
only when offered by the prosecution. In United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the D.C. Circuit
addressed this issue: "The apparently absolute language of 803(8)(B) had its origin in congressional concern that use
of reports against defendants would be unfair." Id. at 969 n.24. Accordingly, "803(8)(B) should be read, in accordance
with the obvious intent of Congress and in harmony with 803(8)(C) to authorize the admission of the reports of police
officers and other law enforcement personnel at the request of the defendant in a criminal case." Id. at 968 n.24.
See also Onto Evm. R. 803(8)(B) (explicitly exempting reports "offered by the defendant" from the police records
exclusion); State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 996-97 (Me. 1984) (police lab report offered by defendant admissible as
business record).
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the amendment, Representative Dennis, stated: "I think in a criminal case you ought
to have to call the policeman on the beat and give the defendant the chance to cross
examine him, rather than just reading the report into evidence. That is the purpose of
this amendment." s58 Representative Holtzman believed the amendment "reaffirms
the right of cross examination," a right that "guarantees due process of law and a fair
trial.' 59 Similarly, Representative Johnson commented that without the amendment,
the Supreme Court would declare the rule "unconstitutional.' '6 Second, the
legislative history also indicates concern about the reliability of police reports. For
example, the Senate Committee Report contains the following comment on the
amendment:
Ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene
of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public
officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the
police and the defendant in criminal cases.6'
In other words, the police officers' role in the "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime" 62 undercuts the reliability of their reports. This is a somewhat
different concern than the one raised in the House debates, which seemed to
emphasize the right to face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination, notwith-
standing the reliability of a report. 63
The congressional concerns about confrontation and reliability, however,
focused on one particular type of police report-a report by a "police officer," an
"investigator," or as expressed by the amendment's sponsor, a "policeman on the
beat.' '64 The example used in the House debates involved an officer who "made a
report that he saw Mr. X with a gun on such and such an occasion .... -65 This
emphasis on crime scene investigations that entail adversarial confrontations with the
accused has led to divergent interpretations of Congress' intent in enacting the police
records exclusion.
58. 120 CONG. Rac. 2387 (1974).
59. Id. at 2388.
60. Id.
61. S. RaP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AuN. NEws 7051, 7064.
62. The quoted phrase comes from a Supreme Court decision contrasting the function of a neutral and detached
magistrate with that of a policeman in determining probable cause. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
63. The reliability of police reports did not seem to be a concern of Representative Dennis, the sponsor of the
amendment. Representative Smith argued against the amendment because he believed it made police officers
"second-class citizens and persons less trustworthy than social workers or garbage collectors." 120 CoNG. REc. 2388
(1974). Representative Dennis disagreed:
I would like to say on that point that of course is not my idea. I think the point is that we are dealing here with
criminal cases, and in a criminal case the defendant should be confronted with the accuser to give him the chance
to cross-examine. This is not any reflection on the police officer ....
Id.
64. 120 CoNG. Rac. 2387 (1974).
65. Id. at 2388 (remarks of Representative Brasco).
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1. Routine Records
In Oates the Second Circuit adopted a literal interpretation of the police records
exclusion, under which all police reports are inadmissible. 66 According to the court,
prosecution laboratory reports fell within the exclusion. 67 In contrast, other courts
have adopted a more flexible approach, holding that the exclusion does not apply to
all police records. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "Congress did not
intend to exclude [police] records of routine, nonadversarial matters .... ",68 The
court focused on the Senate Committee Report's language concerning the "adver-
sarial nature of the confrontation" between the police and the defendant "at the scene
of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant. ' 69 One court accepting this view
has stated:
In the case of documents recording routine, objective observations, made as part of the
everyday function of the preparing official or agency, the factors likely to cloud the
perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions of
observation and investigation of crime are simply not present. Due to the lack of any
motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than mechanically register an
unambiguous factual matter .... such records are, like other public documents, inherently
reliable. 70
Under this approach courts have admitted police reports containing the routine
recording of license plate7l and serial numbers, 72 chain of custody documents, 73
warrants of deportation, 74 a marshall's return on service of an injunction, 75 and
breathalyzer calibration certificates. 76
If laboratory analyses are considered routine and objective, they are admissible
under this approach. 77 According to one court, a chemist "does no more than seek to
establish an intrinsically neutral fact. .... "78 Another has stated that reports of
chemical analyses "contain[ ] objective facts rather than expressions of opinion. "79
Thus, one commentator has written:
66. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 (2d Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 78-80.
68. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
69. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17).
70. United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations onitted).
71. United States v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415, 1418 (5th Cir. 1987) (customs officer's recording of license plate
numbers admissible); United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir.) (customs officer's recording of license
plate numbers admissible), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
72. United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (routine recording of serial numbers of firearms
unrelated to commission of crime admissible).
73. United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 910-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
74. United States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hemandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d
533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980).
75. United States v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (lst Cir. 1978).
76. United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1626 (1987).
See also United States v. Gilbert, 774 F.2d 962, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1985) (notations on fingerprint card admissible
as routine, nonadversarial record).
77. E.g., State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 381, 323 S.E.2d 316, 327 (1984) (rejecting Oates and admitting report
of breath analysis tests). See also State v. Smith, 66 Or. App. 703, 707, 675 P.2d 510, 512 (1984) (distinguishing Oates
and admitting certificate of breathalyzer inspections).
78. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (1972) (LSD analysis).
79. Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. App. 1984). See also Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476,
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[A] routine report which merely identifies a substance or describes its objective character-
istics, such as a report which states that a specimen is cocaine, or that a vaginal swab
contains seminal fluid, or that a blood sample contains .15% alcohol, should qualify for
admission under [rule 803(8)] if the tests upon which such a report is based are ministerial
in nature, requiring the analyst to do little more than record the results of a mathematical
computation or the reading of a dial.' 0
The characterization of laboratory procedures as routine and objective is not without
problems. As noted by one court, a laboratory report identifying a substance as
marijuana is "not concerned with routine observations of acts, conditions or events
observed or recorded by presumably neutral public officials." 8 1 Rather, it involves
"the examination and evaluation of crucial evidence against a defendant made after
the commencement of a criminal prosecution and for use in that prosecution."82 Here
again, the legal issue turns on an understanding of the scientific procedures
involved-whether these procedures are "routine and objective" or "evaluative."
2. Other Law Enforcement Personnel
A related issue involves the meaning of the term "other law enforcement
personnel." The police records exclusion applies only to reports prepared by "police
officers and other law enforcement personnel."83 In Oates the court held that
chemists employed by the U.S. Customs Service were "law enforcement
personnel.'' 84 According to the court, "any officer or employee of a governmental
agency which has law enforcement responsibilities" is covered by that term, and
"[c]hemists at the laboratory are, without question, important participants in the
prosecutorial effort." '8 5
Because the legislative history provides no elaboration of the term "other law
enforcement personnel," room for disagreement with the Oates' interpretation
remains.8 6 Indeed, the Oates court labelled the issue a "difficult question." 87 As
previously noted, in adopting the police records exclusion, Congress focused on the
481 (4th Cir.) (Certificate of blood alcohol test results involves "an objective fact, not a mere expression of
opinion .. "), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
80. Alexander, supra note 52, at 727-28 (footnote omitted). See also S. SALTZauRo & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RUr.s
oF EVIDENCE MANUaAL 837 (4th ed. 1986) ("But it is by no means clear that reports like those offered in [Oates], laboratory
reports conducted according to scientific principles utilized in experiments conducted day after day the same way in
controlled circumstances, were meant to be included under the heading 'Police Reports.' ").
81. State v. Matulewicz, 198 N.J. Super. 474, 477, 487 A.2d 772, 773 (App. Div. 1985) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 477, 487 A.2d at 773-74 (emphasis added).
83. FED. R. EviD. 803(8).
84. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. Id.
86. Other courts have interpreted this phrase. See United States v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Customs Service officials are 'law enforcement personnel' within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(B)."); United States v.
Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 1986) ("IRS agents appear to be law enforcement personnel .. "); United States
v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.) (customs inspector at border qualified as "law enforcement personnel" under
rule 803(8)(B)), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir.) (city building
inspectors not "law enforcement personnel"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); United States v. Ruffim, 575 F.2d 346,
356 (2d Cir. 1978) (IRS personnel who gather data and information routinely used in criminal prosecutions perform a law
enforcement function).
87. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. 1977).
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"policeman on the beat," ' 88 and it may be that laboratory analysts should be treated
differently. For example, one court has commented that a chemist does "not have an
interest in the outcome of trials."89 Many criminalists share this view: "The forensic
scientist does not serve as an advocate for the plaintiff, prosecution, or defendant; he
serves as an advocate for an opinion or conclusion based on objective physical
evidence.'' 9o Accordingly, one commentator has concluded that laboratory analysts
should not be considered "other law enforcement personnel":
Congress was concerned with confrontation rights and the adversarial positions of the
defendant and the policeman "on the scene." This relation does not exist with a chemist or
someone with similar duties. He does not face the defendant and is not on the streets....
The use of the phrase "other law enforcement personnel" should be restricted to actual
Customs agents, FBI agents, and Treasury officials with police powers, such as the Secret
Service. The mere fact that an individual works for a government agency that also has police
personnel should not be a bar to his report coming into evidence, as the trustworthiness of
his analytical tests (as in the case of the chemist) is simply not affected by the arrest
confrontations that take place outside an office or a lab. 9'
There may be several problems with this view. First, many laboratory examiners
are law enforcement officers and thus have "police powers. ' 92 Second, the modern
crime laboratory is an integral part of the law enforcement establishment. 93 "Of the
approximately 300 crime laboratories in the United States, over 80 percent are in
police departments. "94 Moreover, most laboratories only examine evidence submit-
ted by the police or prosecution. A survey of 257 crime laboratories revealed that
"[flifty-seven percent . . .would only examine evidence submitted by law
enforcement officials." 95 For example, the services of the FBI laboratory are
available without charge to all duly constituted state, county, and municipal law
enforcement agencies in the United States. 96 Consequently, the neutrality of the
analyst can be questioned. 97 A few crime laboratories, however, do analyze items
88. 120 Co,,G. REc. 2387 (1974).
89. Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C. App. 1984).
90. See Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 674 (1984).
91. Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard for Public Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12 WEST. ST. U.L.
REv. 53, 78 (1984).
92. See NATIONAL DVISORY CoM'N ON CRIMUNAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 303 (1974) ("There are
... many police laboratories that have been staffed almost exclusively with sworn personnel.").
93. See PREsmNerr's COIM'N O.4 LAW ENORC EmENr AND AD.MN. OF JusncE, THE CHAULEGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
Soc=r 255 (1967) ("The crime laboratory has been the oldest and strongest link between science and technology and
criminal justice.").
94. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 633 (1984) (remarks of Professor
Joseph Peterson). See also Peterson, Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's
Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC So. 10, 11 (1985) ("Seventy-nine percent of all laboratories responding to
our survey are located within law enforcement/public safety agencies.").
95. Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
96. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvESTIGATION, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 7 (Rev. ed. 1984). See also Williams,
The FBI Laboratory-Its Availability and Use by Prosecutors from Investigation to Trial, 28 U. KAN. CITY L. Rev. 95,
99 (1960).
97. "Given what is known about reference group phenomena, the need that people have for social support of
attitudes and conduct, and the process of socialization in occupational settings, it strains credulity to believe that these
experts do not identify with prosecutors." M. SAKs & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF ScternTIc EvmENCE IN LrIOATION
53 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Also of some interest
perhaps is a remark made by [the expert] which indicates that the Customs chemists do not mentally disassociate
themselves from those who undoubtedly are law enforcement personnel.").
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:671
submitted by the defense,98 and these may have a more plausible claim to neutrality.
For example, in State v. Manke,99 the court in admitting a laboratory report observed:
"There is nothing to indicate the laboratory report was made with any improper
motive. Section 19-01-10 . . . places the State Laboratories Department at the
disposal of the prosecution and the defense counsel; hence it is independent of both
parties."1oo
Nonetheless, framing the issue in this way obscures the critical concern. While
the analyst may not be absolutely neutral, he is further removed from the scene than
the policeman on the beat, and thus the pressures to slant evidence are far less in most
cases. Even if this observation is correct, however, it tells us nothing about the
analyst's qualifications, the validity of his procedures, or the accuracy of his
conclusions.101 Bias may be a problem, but it is not the main problem.
C. Business Records Exception
Prosecution laboratory reports may also be admissible as business records.' ° 2
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the admissibility of these reports as
business records raised two issues: (1) whether the results reported were properly
considered inadmissible opinions, as opposed to facts, and (2) whether the reports
were excludable because they were prepared in anticipation of prosecution. 10 3 Federal
Rule 803(6),10 4 which governs the business records exception, settles the first issue
by expressly providing for the admissibility of "opinions" and "diagnoses."
98. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-01-10 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-433 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
165.79(1) (West Supp. 1987). See generally Note, Exploring the Limits of Brady v. Maryland: Criminal Discovery as a
Due Process Right in Access to Police Investigations and State Crime Laboratories, 15 U. RiCH. L. REv. 189, 208-10
(1980).
99. 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982).
100. Id. at 803. Even in this context, the neutrality of the analyst has been questioned:
Control of the forensic science laboratory in Virginia was transferred about 11 years ago from the Department
of Public Safety, where it functioned as a police laboratory, to the Department of General Services, where it
operates as part of the consolidated laboratory system of the state. I assure you that this was a change in name
only and not in attitude of the personnel. Prosecuting attorneys and other members of the law enforcement
community continue to be the main consumers of forensic services, and the forensic scientists still are in spirit,
if no longer in law, members of that police community. A Virginia statute allows defense attorneys to use these
services, but only four requests have been submitted in over a decade. As nearly as I have been able to
determine, this disappointing response is due to mistrust by defense attorneys of the laboratory personnel, whom
they consider to be employees of a police laboratory.
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 646 (1984) (remarks of Professor Andre
Moenssens).
101. Even if laboratory reports are generally admissible as public records, the final clause of rule 803(8) may still
bar admissibility. That clause recognizes the trial court's authority to exclude public records if "the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. Evm. 803(8). Application of this clause would directly
raise the issue of the reliability of laboratory reports, at least on a case-by-case basis. It is not entirely clear, however,
that the trustworthiness clause applies to records admitted under subdivision (B) of the rule. See 4 D. LoutsEL & C.
MuEume, FEDRA. EvmDENcE § 456 (1980).
102. See cases cited supra note 23.
103. See Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal
Defendants, 30 HAsretos L.J. 621, 626-29 (1979).
104. FED. R. EvuD. 803(6) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept
in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
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1. Litigation Records
The second issue, the admissibility of records prepared in anticipation of
litigation, however, remains problematic. Rule 803(6) contains a trustworthiness
clause, under which business records are excludable if "the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness." 105 One
factor affecting reliability is the motivation of the person who prepares the report-
whether the record was "prepared with an eye toward litigation."'10 6 The exclusion
of "litigation records" has long been applied to police reports. For example, in
United States v. Ware, 10 7 a pre-Federal Rules case, the Seventh Circuit wrote:
[E]ven if memoranda... are regularly prepared by law enforcement officers, they lack the
necessary earmarks of reliability and trustworthiness. Their source and the nature and
manner of their compilation unavoidably dictate that they are inadmissible under [the
Federal Business Records Act]. They are also subject to objection that such utility as they
possess relates primarily to prosecution of suspected law breakers, and only incidentally to
the systematic conduct of the police business.' 08
Nevertheless, the courts applying the litigation records exclusion generally have not
extended it to laboratory reports.10 9 For example, one court has stated: "We are not
persuaded that a chemical examiner's report is made principally for the purpose of
prosecution."' ' o This view, however, has not gone unchallenged. A different court
has written that laboratory reports "cannot be said to have been prepared for any
reason other than their potential litigation value."'' In this context, the "litigation
records" rule is comparable to the police records exclusion of rule 803(8): it raises
the same underlying issue-whether the law enforcement function of a crime
laboratory undercuts the reliability of its reports. Here again, posing the reliability
issue in this way ignores far more significant aspects of the problem, such as the
expert's qualifications and the validity of his procedures.
2. Relationship with Public Records Exception
In addition to the reliability issue, the business records exception raises another
concern-whether this exception may be used in lieu of the public records
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and caling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159,
162-63 (10th Cir. 1986) (IRS contact card prepared for litigation).
As Smith notes, the "litigation records" exclusion is derived from Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). The
advisory committee indicated that the trustworthiness clause was intended to codify Palmer. FED. R. Evro. 803(6)
advisory committee note.
107. 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
108. Id. at 700. Accord United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown,
451 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1961).
109. E.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698,
699 (7th Cir. 1957); In re Nelson, 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083-84, 374 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-86 (Farn. Ct. 1975).
110. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (1972). See also United States v.
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 228 (C.M.A. 1979).
111. State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tenn. 1977).
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exception.112 Several courts have held that documents excludable under the public
records exception are not admissible under any other hearsay exception. For example,
in Oates the prosecution argued that the chemist's report was admissible as a business
record. 113 Although the Second Circuit recognized that as a general rule hearsay
statements failing to satisfy the requirements of one exception may nonetheless be
admissible under another exception," 4 it found that Congress' "clear legislative
intent" in excluding police and investigative reports in rule 803(8) precluded their
admission under any other exception.11 5
Other courts have disagreed with Oates and have held that Congress intended to
exclude these reports only when offered in lieu of the testimony of the declarant.
According to these courts: "The accompanying testimony of the author minimizes
the danger of unreliability by giving the trier of fact the opportunity to weigh his
credibility and consider the circumstances surrounding preparation of the report." 116
Under this view, if a laboratory report qualifies as a business record and the declarant
also testifies, the report is admissible. For example, in United States v. Coleman,1 17
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the admission of DEA chemical analysis
forms where the examining chemist testified about the controlled substance. The
court, though, reversed, without reaching the merits, as to those counts where a
supervising chemist testified in place of the examining chemist. 118 In this situation,
the presence of the analyst at trial eliminates any serious hearsay or confrontation
objection because the reliability of the laboratory results can be tested by cross-
examination.
3. Nongovernmental Records
In addition, laboratory reports prepared by nongovernmental agencies, such as
private hospital records, may fall within the business records exception." 9 In this
situation many of the issues discussed above do not arise. There is neither an overlap
with the public records exception, nor are these records necessarily prepared with an
eye toward litigation. Nevertheless, the reliability of the report remains an issue. The
112. See generally 4 D. LotnsELL & C. MuEu.E, FEDERA. EvmENCE §§ 452, 456 (1980); 4 J. WVEISTINM & M.
BERGER, NVmsTNm's EvmEscE 803(6)[07] (1987); Annotation, Admissibility Over Hearsay Objection of Police
Observations and Investigative Findings Offered by Government in Criminal Prosecution Excluded from Public Records
Exception to Hearsay Rule Under Rule 803(8)(B) or (C), Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 A.L.R. FED. 168 (1982).
113. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 68, 72, 77. Accord United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1983) (certificate of
foreign government); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377-78 (9th Cir. 1980) (FBI report); United States v. Cain,
615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980) (prison escape report); United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1978)
(IRS computer printouts).
116. United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980) (Social Security forms admitted as business records
where the preparers testified). Accord United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986) (recorded recollections
of DEA agent who testified at trial admissible under Rule 803(5)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 166 (1986); United States v.
Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (recorded recollections of IRS agent who testified at trial admissible under
Rule 803(5)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). See also Abdel v. United States, 670 F.2d 73, 75 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982).
In United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 25-27 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit ruled Oates inapplicable to
records admissible under rule 803(10), absent a public record.
117. 631 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
118. Id. at 914-15.
119. See cases cited supra note 17.
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trustworthiness clause of rule 803(6) covers more than litigation records; the "method
or circumstances of preparation" 120 would encompass the scientific procedures upon
which the laboratory report is based. The qualifications of the analyst, his methods,
and findings all raise trustworthiness issues.
D. Summary
The admissibility of laboratory reports under the Federal Rules remains
uncertain, principally because the issue is one of congressional intent and that intent
as it relates to this type of report is difficult to discern. On the one hand, given the
prior federal cases, which generally admitted such reports, and the legislative focus
on "crime-scene" reports, it can be argued that laboratory reports should be
admitted. On the other hand, those cases were decided "before the recent wave of
cases broadening the interpretation of the confrontation clause," 1 21 and Congress
clearly was concerned with confrontation values when it added the police records
exclusion to rule 803(8)(B).122 Moreover, Congress may have assumed that labora-
tory reports were inadmissible investigative reports under rule 803(8)(C).
Given this uncertainty, a more fruitful analysis would focus directly on the
reliability of laboratory examinations and how their results are reported. Such an
analysis is the key to the hearsay rule. Attempting to determine whether laboratory
analysts are law enforcement personnel or neutral scientists, or whether laboratory
reports are litigation records, obscures this central issue. If laboratory procedures
present serious trustworthiness issues, those issues apply to reports prepared by
private as well as public laboratories.1 2 3 Moreover, the reliability issue is an essential
aspect of a confrontation analysis and thus is considered in the next section, which
examines the sixth amendment requirements.
m11. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
Even if laboratory reports are admissible under a hearsay exception, t24 the
Confrontation Clause' may require exclusion. A hearsay declarant is, in effect, a
"witness against" the accused. Thus, a literal interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay statement,
120. FED. R. Evto. 803(6).
121. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 74 n.31 (2d Cir. 1977).
122. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
123. See S. SALtruRo & K. REDDEN, supra note 80, at 837 ("If a private laboratory's report would have been
admitted, it is not clear why the Government's laboratory report [in Oates] should not have been admitted.").
124. For example, the Military Rules of Evidence explicitly provide for the admissibility of "forensic laboratory
reports." Ma.. R. Evn,. 803(6) (business records); Mu.. R. EviD. 803(8) (public records).
125. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Court
held the right of confrontation applicable to state trials.
For discussions of the relationship between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, see 4 D. LousEt. & C.
MuEu.ER, FEDERAL. EvrDEscE § 418 (1980); 4 J. WE NsrmN & M. BERGER, W 'lsmm's EvmucE 800[04] (1987);
Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REa. 557 (1988); Lilly, Notes on the
Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. Rav. 207 (1984); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77
Mictl, L. R-v. 1185 (1979); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1978).
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notwithstanding the applicability of a recognized hearsay exception. The Supreme
Court has never adopted this interpretation. 126 The Confrontation Clause also could
be interpreted as requiring only the right to cross-examine in-court witnesses and not
out-of-court declarants. Under this view, all recognized hearsay exceptions would
satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court has also rejected this view.127
Instead of either of these two approaches, the Court has attempted to define an
intermediate position, a task that has proved to be elusive. 128 In Ohio v. Roberts,129
the Court identified two values operating in this context: the "Framers' preference
for face-to-face accusation," 130 and an "underlying purpose to augment accuracy in
the factfinding process .... "1131 From these values, the Court derived a two-step
analysis that focused on the unavailability of the declarant and the reliability of the
hearsay statement:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability."1 32
This summation of confrontation requirements immediately raised problems. Roberts
involved the admissibility of a preliminary hearing transcript as former testimony, a
hearsay exception that traditionally required a showing of unavailability. Most
hearsay exceptions, however, do not require such a showing. 133 Accordingly, the
applicability of the Court's two-pronged test to these exceptions would represent a
significant expansion of confrontation requirements. As one commentator has noted,
"Beneath [Roberts'] apparently orthodox disposition . . . lies an interpretation of
possibly far-reaching significance."' 134
126. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("[I]f thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every
hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.").
127. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court wrote:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to
protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as
they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we
have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted
under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.... The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is
admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that
confrontation rights have been denied.
Id. at 155-56. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two,
and we decline to do so now.").
128. See United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838, 843 (1988) ("This Court has recognized a partial (and somewhat
indeterminate) overlap between the requirements of the traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause."); C.
McCos.CK, EvrnaNcE 749 (3d ed. 1984) ("A discussion of constitutional limitations upon the use of hearsay might well
commence with the observation that their outline is somewhat less than clear." (footnote omitted)).
129. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
130. Id. at 65.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 66.
133. For example, Federal Rule 803 contains twenty-four exceptions where the availability of the declarant is
immaterial. See FED. R. EviD. 803(l)-(24).
134. See Lilly, supra note 125, at 224. But see M. GttMH, EviDmrca: TExT, RULES, ILLUSRATIONS AND PnOBLEMS
290-91 n.6 (1983) ("[IThe casualness displayed in making the comment with respect to unavailability ... belies any
intention to make a radical change in the law.").
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A later case, United States v. Inadi,135 however, supports a narrow reading of
Roberts. Inadi addressed the admissibility of statements under the coconspirator
exception-in particular, whether the prosecution must demonstrate the declarant's
unavailability. 136 Limiting Roberts to former testimony cases, 137 the Court wrote:
"Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court
statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant
is unavailable."1 38 Nevertheless, in a more recent case, Bourjaily v. United States,139
the Court again referred to the two-pronged test, albeit in qualified terms: "[T]he
Court has, as a general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate both the
unavailability of the declarant and the 'indicia of reliability' surrounding the
out-of-court declaration.''140 Like Inadi, Bourjaily involved the coconspirator
exception, but the issue before the Court concerned the reliability of such statements
rather than the unavailability of the declarant. Together, these cases address the
two-pronged test: Inadi held that a showing of unavailability is not required in this
context; Bourjaily held that coconspirator statements are reliable. Accordingly, both
reliability and unavailability are considered in the following sections. ,4'
A. Indicia of Reliability
Several passages in Roberts indicate that most statements falling within the
public and business records exceptions will have no difficulty satisfying the reliability
requirement. In one passage, the Court stated that "certain hearsay exceptions rest
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "142 In an accom-
panying footnote, the Court cited the business and public records exceptions as
examples. 143 In another passage, the Court noted that "[r]eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception."' 144 From a historical viewpoint, both exceptions would appear to qualify
as "firmly rooted."' 145 Indeed, the Court adopted this historical approach in
Bourjaily. Tracing the coconspirator exception back over a century and a half, the
Court found the exception "firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence.' 146
135. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
136. Id. at 391.
137. The Court wrote:
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not presented in that case, but rather as a resolution
of the issue the Court said it was examining: "the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of the
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial."
Id. at 392-93 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 394.
139. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
140. Id. at 2782 (citations omitted).
141. The Court also mentioned the two-pronged test in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,539 (1986), which was decided
during the same term as Inadi.
142. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
143. Id. at 66 n.8.
144. Id. at 66.
145. See 5 1. WIGo.ORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1517-61b (business records), §§ 1630-38a (public records).
146. Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987). For a critical assessment of the "firmly rooted"
criteria, see Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1987).
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Although business and public records generally may bear adequate indicia of
reliability, laboratory reports may not. Simply stated, not all business and public
records are alike. The drafters of the Federal Rules recognized this by identifying
three different categories of public records and placing different limitations on their
admissibility. For example, although public records are generally admissible under
rule 803(8), investigative reports are not when offered by the prosecution because "of
the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which would result from their
use against the accused in a criminal case." 147 Similarly, the inclusion of the
trustworthiness clauses in both the public and business records exceptions supports
the proposition that some of these records pose serious reliability risks.
B. Reliability of Laboratory Reports
Reliability issues involve two different but related problems-the first concerns
the reliability of the scientific test itself; the second involves the way in which the test
results are reported.
1. Reliability of the Test
There is little question that laboratory examinations may result in incorrect
findings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the results of laboratory
tests may be contrived,' 1 48 and in one instance an FBI analyst "reported results of
lab tests that he did not in fact conduct." 1 49 Moreover, erroneous conclusions have
been reported even with well-accepted scientific techniques. In one case, a court
wrote: "The fingerprint expert's testimony was damning-and it was false."' 150
Similarly, a firearms identification expert in a different case "negligently presented
false demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony."' 15
These examples, however, are not determinative. Many business and public
records undoubtedly contain errors, and yet their general reliability has long been
acknowledged. The issue is whether laboratory reports pose such a greater risk of
error than other types of public and business records that their admission infringes
upon confrontation guarantees.
Unfortunately, the examples cited above cannot be dismissed as isolated
instances. In 1978 the results of a Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program sponsored
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration were reported.152 Over 200 crime
147. FED. R. EviD. 803(8) advisory committee note.
148. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973).
149. State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285 (Me. 1979). See also State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. 113, 118, 394
N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (C.P. 1978) (Expert represented that certain laboratory tests were conducted, when "no such tests
were ever conducted."); Annotation, Perjury or Wilfully False Testimony of Expert Witness as Basis for New Trial on
Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.L.R.3d 812 (1971).
150. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982). This case is discussed in Starts, A Miscue in
Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concerns, 12 J. PoucF Sc,. & ADmiN. 287 (1984).
151. In re Kirschke, 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 408, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (1975). For a discussion of this case as
well as other illustrations of erroneous expert testimony, see Starrs, In the Land of Agog: An Allegory for the Expert
Witness, 30 J. Fo~RNsic Sc. 289 (1985).
152. J. PErERSON, E. FABinIc.r & K. FEuLD, CRaME LABORATORY PROFiCtENCY Thro RuSEARCH PRoGRAM
(L.E.A.A. Oct. 1978).
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laboratories participated in this program, which involved such common forensic
examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and trace evidence analyses. The Report
concluded: "A wide range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories
exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the labora-
tories .... '' 153 Thus, although some laboratories performed exceptionally well, the
performance of others was disturbing: "65 percent of the laboratories had 80 percent
or more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the other end of the
spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less than 50 percent of their responses
considered acceptable."' -4 Similarly, certain types of examinations caused few
problems, whereas others produced very high rates of "unacceptable proficien-
cy." 155 Unacceptable proficiency was most often attributed to: (1) misinterpretation
of test results due to carelessness or inexperience; (2) failure to employ adequate or
appropriate methodology; (3) mislabeling or contamination of primary standards; and
(4) inadequate data bases or standard spectra.' 56 One of the report's authors later
commented: "In spite of being a firm advocate of forensic science, I must
153. Id. at 3.
154. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in THmnreo ABOUr POucE 184, 195 (C. KIockars ed. 1983) [hereinafter The Crime
Lab.].
155. Unacceptable response rates for the various test samples were as follows:
Test Sample Evidence Type Rate
I Controlled substance 7.8%
2 Firearms 28.2%
3 Blood 3.8%
4 Glass 4.8%
5 Paint 20.5%
6 Drugs 1.7%
7 Frearms 5.3%
8 Blood 71.3%
9 Glass 31.3%
10 Paint 51.4%
11 Soil 35.5%
12 Fibers 1.7%
13 Physiological Fluids (A) 2.3%
(B) 1.6%
14 Arson 28.8%
15 Dregs 18.2%
16 Paint 34.0%
17 Metal 22.1%
18 Hair (A) 50.0%
(B) 27.8%
(C) 54.4%
(D) 67.8%
(E) 35.6%
19 Wood 21.5%
20 Questioned Documents (A) 5.4%
(3) 18.9%
21 Firearms 13.6%
The number of laboratories responding ranged from a low of 65 to a high of 205. An unacceptable response did not
necessarily mean an incorrect response. Other reasons for an unacceptable designation included a correct response for the
wrong reason, an unsupported, inclusive response, multiple responses, and incomplete responses. Id. at 188-91.
156. J. PETERSON, E.FABIcANTr & K. F=sw, supra note 152, at 258.
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acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are not performing
routine tests competently, as shown by our proficiency testing." 57
Perhaps as troubling as the results of this study are the reasons that may underlie
them. In 1967 the President's Crime Commission commented that "the great
majority of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack
highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed and
produced by the instrumentation industry."158 A later commission concluded: "Too
many police crime laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the
recruitment of qualified, professional personnel."' 59 Since the time these reports
were issued, the number of crime laboratories has increased dramatically, from about
100 in 1968, to more than 300 in 1983.160 Problems, however, remain.' 6 1 In
particular, national standards to ensure the competency of examiners have not been
developed. As explained by Professor-Peterson:
[There are no minimum standards or certification requirements that must be satisfied before
these examiners become responsible for analyzing the evidence and testifying in court. Nor
are standard laboratory procedures available that the examiners are expected to follow when
analyzing typical forms of evidence. 162
In addition, quality control procedures, such as independent proficiency testing, are
not required by the majority of laboratories, 163 although attempts to change this
situation have been undertaken.) 64 Other problems, such as high caseload
157. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984) (remarks of Professor
Joseph Peterson).
Problems involving proficiency testing are not limited to crime laboratories. A proficiency testing program of
laboratories engaged in urine analyses for drug detection reached the following conclusions: "Error rates for the 13
laboratories on samples containing barbituates, amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, codeine, and morphine ranged from
11% to 94%, 19% to 100%, 0% to 33%, 0% to 100%, 0% to 100%, and 5% to 100%, respectively." Hansen, Caudill
& Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Study, 253 J. Am. ME. A. 2382, 2382 (1985).
158. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION F JusncE, THE CHALLmGE OF CmiE IN A
FeE SoCmY 255 (1967).
159. NATIONAL DVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, PoIUCE 304 (1974).
160. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 1, at 1731-33.
161. "The newly formed laboratories and existing laboratories continued to suffer from the same old problems: lack
of coordination, unqualified personnel, and the absence of uniform standards and procedures to guide the analysis and
interpretation of evidence." Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 154, at 185.
162. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642-43 (1984) (remarks by
Professor Joseph Peterson).
Attempts to develop national certification standards in the forensic sciences has produced mixed results. The
following passage summarizes these efforts:
Beginning in 1976, the forensic science field launched a major effort to establish peer-based certifying bodies
that would review the credentials of persons in the field, administer qualifying examinations, and certify those
qualified to practice in their chosen forensic specialty. To date, certification boards have been established in the
areas of forensic toxicology, odontology, psychiatry, anthropology, and questioned-document examination
(forensic pathology has had a long-standing certification board). A committee was established by crime-
laboratory examiners to develop a set of guidelines for certification. These guidelines were presented to the
nation's crime-laboratory personnel for approval in the form of a referendum. The subsequent response,
unfortunately, was distinctly negative: the certification referendum was defeated by a 2-to-I margin.
Consequently, at the present time the criminalistic profession as a whole is without minimum standards
regarding who is qualified to practice in the field.
Peterson, Ethical Issues in the Collection, Examination, and Use of Physical Evidence, in FORENSIC SCINCE 35, 43 (G.
Davies ed. 1986) [hereinafter Ethical Issues].
163. "Crime laboratories are unique among publicly supported scientific operations in that few participate in
external quality assurance programs." Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 154, at 196.
164. A fee-based proficiency-testing program under the auspices of the Forensic Science Foundation and
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volume,1 65 have also been cited. The picture that emerges is one of inconsistency,
with some very good laboratories at one end of the spectrum and some very poor ones
at the other end.
Even when competent analysts use valid procedures, error may occur. The
reason is that the conclusions drawn from many commonly employed procedures are
based on subjective judgments, 166 with the result that disagreement among experts is
possible. Courts excluding scientific reports have noted this problem. 167 Psychiatric
evaluations and autopsy reports are perhaps the clearest examples. This problem,
however, goes far beyond these illustrations. Even apparently routine and objective
procedures involve an element of subjectivity. For example, a firearms identification
examiner may conclude that two bullets had been fired from the same weapon.168
Although a positive identification is based on objective data-the striations on the
bullet surfaces-the examiner's conclusion rests on a subjective evaluation. There
are no objective critera used for this determination: "In general, the texts on firearms
identification take the position that each practitioner must develop his own intuitive
criteria of identity gained through practical experience."'' 69 In this sense, firearms
identification is more of an art than a science.' 70 Thus, it is not surprising that two
Collaborative Testing Services is available. See generally Lucas, Leete & Field, An American Proficiency Testing
Program, 27 FoRENsic Sci. INT'L 71 (1985). Nevertheless, participation is voluntary and incomplete. "Only about
one-third of the crime laboratories in the nation subscribe to these tests, and about one-half of the laboratories receiving
samples actually return results." Peterson, Ethical Issues, supra note 162, at 44. The American Society of
Crime-Laboratory Directors' accreditation program requires an independent testing program. See F.B.I., 14 CRIE
LABORArORY DIG. 37 (April 1987) (51 labs accredited since 1982). Participation, however, is voluntary and thus "crime
laboratories that produce results of marginal quality may simply elect not to participate." Peterson, Ethical Issues, supra
note 162, at 44.
165. See Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1984) ("Unfortunately,
errors in high-volume operations are not uncommon.") (remarks of Professor James Starts); J. PErEttON, S. M tlALovIc
& M. GaimAND, FoRENsic EvIENcE AND THE PoLIcE: THE EiwEcrs oF ScmNTnoc EvmEscE oN CRIMINAL INvEsTGATIONS 222
(Nat'l Institute of Justice, Oct. 1984) ("Laboratories must guard against examining cases superficially, which is likely to
result if incoming case volume is high and there is pressure to turn around laboratory results as quickly as possible.").
166. As McCormick notes, identification evidence is based either on "the general experience of the criminalists or
more exacting statistical studies." C. McCotucK, EvmuEsc 652 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). Fingerprint, firearms
identification, and handwriting comparisons fall into the former category. Because they are not statistically-based, they
are necessarily somewhat subjective, at least in the sense that adequate criteria do not exist which would permit
the expert to articulate the precise foundations for his conclusion that a "match" exists or that there is a certain
probability of identity. Thus, one expert may feel that a positive result is established while another feels equally
strongly that the same evidence does not warrant such a conclusion. These identifications thus depend on the
"intuitive ability" and "common sense" of the expert.
Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CAtn'. L. Ray. 997, 1022 (1971) (footnote omitted).
167. E.g., United States v. MeClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1292 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[B]ecause of the various means of
evaluation and apparent subjective decisions that enter into the evaluation of gems, McClintock's confrontation of the
preparers of the reports may have been valuable to his defense."); Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 312, 322
A.2d 653, 655 (1974) ("Frequently, the cause of death is seriously in issue and the subject of conflicting opinion by
qualified physicians.").
168. E.g., United States v. Wolff, 5 M.J. 923, 926 (N.C.M.R. 1978),petition denied, 6 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1979);
People v. Torres, 100 I11. App. 3d 931, 937, 427 N.E.2d 329, 334-35 (1981); State v. Harriman, 469 So. 2d 298,
306-07 (La. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986); State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 332-33, 240 S.E.2d 794,
802-03 (1978); State v. Benton, 413 A.2d 104, 112-13 (R.I. 1980); State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah
1985); McDaniel v. State, 632 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Wyo. 1981).
169. Biasotti, The Principles of Evidence Evaluation as Applied to Firearms and Tool Mark Identification, 9 1.
Fo.msisc Sci. 428, 429 (1964). See also J. PEmsoN, E. FABRiCArTr & K. Fisw, supra note 152, at 207 ("Ultimately,
unless other issues are involved, it remains for the examiner to determine for himself the modicum of proof necessary to
arrive at a definitive opinion.").
170. Biasotti, supra note 169, at 432 ("[W]e lack the fundamental statistical data needed to develop verifiable
criteria .... ).
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experts may disagree about whether there are sufficient points of identity to render a
positive conclusion. 171 Fingerprint evidence raises the same problem. Because there
is no consensus on the number of points necessary for an identification, fingerprint
identification is "an evaluative art." 172 Again, disagreement among experts remains
a possibility:
In a murder case... state police fingerprint experts testified that a latent print lifted from
the crime's scene was the defendant's by demonstrating 14 points of similarity. Defense was
able to procure its own expert who proved three crucial points of dissimilarity. An acquittal
followed. 173
Even where the scientific technique uses instrumentation, subjectivity may be a
problem. 174
The point is not that most laboratory test results are erroenous or that
examinations with a subjective element are unreliable. Indeed, the opposite is true.
Rather, the point is that the risk of error is significant enough to preclude routine
admission of test results without the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst. 175
2. Reliability of the Report
The laboratory report itself raises additional reliability concerns, mainly because
of what it does not say. Typically, the report contains only the expert's conclusions.
For instance, in a controlled substance prosecution the report may state only that the
examined substance was "heroin." 176 Other critical information is not disclosed.
First, the bases for the analyst's findings frequently are not revealed. In
particular, the laboratory report will often not indicate the specific test employed. For
example, a gunshot residue report indicating that a person recently fired a weapon
171. See In re Kirschke, 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 411, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (1975) (One firearms identification
expert made a conclusive identification, whereas other experts "were not able to make a positive identification .. ");
State v. Nemeth, 182 Conn. 403, 408, 438 A.2d 120, 123 (1980) (One expert testified "that he was unable to determine
whether the bullets had been fired from the same gun," whereas another "testified that both bullets had been fired from
the same gun."); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 373 Mass. 1, 5, 364 N.E.2d 808, 812 (1977) ("The Commonwealth's two
[firearms identification] experts did not fully agree.").
172. P. GiANN asi & E. IswiNm , SciEmsrc EviDEcE 539 (1986).
173. Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal
Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632, 638 n.38 (1970) (citation omitted). See also Osborn, Proof of Finger-Prints, 26
J. CiuM. L. & CltuuoLoGy 587, 588 (1936) ("[E]rrors in [fingerprint] identification are not only possible but have been
made.").
174. See generally Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting Instrumental Test Results, in PRAcnsrN; LAW
INsrurrr, ScaiErmc AND EXPERT EvIDENcE 409, 430 (2d ed. 1981) ("No scientific function can be freed entirely from the
threat of error induced through subjectivity.").
175. "Only a small percentage of the cases in any jurisdiction go to trial, so the technicians or scientists in the crime
laboratories seldom are called upon to justify their procedures or conclusions under rigorous cross-examination. I think
the realization that their work will not be reviewed - either by independent scientist or by opposing counsel and expert
in court - decreases the care and completeness with which examiners process evidence." Symposium on Science and the
Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 643 (1984) (remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson).
176. United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 525 (8th Cir. 1973) (reprinting laboratory report), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 989 (1974). See also United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982) ("[Mlost laboratory reports
only state general conclusions .. ").
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may be based on the paraffin test, 177 neutron activation analysis, 178 atomic
absorption, 179 scannning electron microscopy, 180 or some other procedure. 181 Some
of these tests are valid, while others are suspect. 182 Similarly, a laboratory report
identifying a substance as marijuana might not specify whether this conclusion is
based upon a visual examination, the Duquenois-Levine test, thin-layer chromatog-
raphy, or some other procedure. Many of these tests are not specific. 183
Additional problems concerning the bases of the expert's opinion exist. Federal
Rule 703 expands the permissible bases of expert testimony. A testifying expert may
rely on inadmissible evidence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field." In short, reliance on hearsay is sanctioned. This rule has proved
controversial as applied to the courtroom testimony of experts. 184 Nevertheless, the
rule may be justified at trial, in part, because cross-examination is available to
disclose to the jury any deficiency in the bases. Thus, one court has written: "Expert
reliance upon the output of others does not necessarily violate the confrontation
clause where the expert is available for questioning concerning the nature and
reasonableness of his reliance."1 85 This is not the case, however, when a laboratory
report is admitted; there may be no indication of the bases in the report much less
whether reliance on extrajudicial sources was reasonable. For example, in one case
a death certificate revealed the identity of the body and the cause of death. 186 Since
autopsy procedures are relatively standardized, it might be assumed that these
conclusions were based on such procedures. Later proceedings, however, revealed
177. A number of courts have admitted evidence derived from the paraffin test. E.g., Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771,
778, 394 S.W.2d 135, 140 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); State v. Hoy, 199 Kan. 340, 348, 430 P.2d 275,
281 (1967); People v. Simpson, 5 Mich. App. 479, 486-87, 146 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1966); Brooklns v. State, 602 P.2d
215, 217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
But see Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 393-94, 339 P.2d 993, 996 (1959); Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 270,
402 S.W.2d 863, 869, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 942 (1966).
178. E.g., State v. Boyer, 406 So. 2d 143, 146-48 (La. 1981); Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986); State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 459-62, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (1974); State
v. Jackson, 566 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 449-50, 387 A.2d
63, 68 (1978).
179. E.g., Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1977); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 38-40, 383
A.2d 440, 441-42 (1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 326-28, 255 S.E.2d 373, 381-82 (1979); State v. McCall,
698 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
180. See People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 252-53, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472-73 (1978).
181. See P. GtANNE'u & E. Ihtwitsimm, supra note 172, § 14-9.
182. For example, the paraffin test has been criticized for its nonspecificity. Many substances other than gunpowder
residues contain nitrates and thus produce a positive reaction, too. One study concluded that a positive reaction is
produced by tobacco, tobacco ash, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, and urine. Turkel & Lipman,
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. CHA. L. & CRMOLOGY 281, 282 (1955). A more
comprehensive study found that "'rust,' colored fingernail polishes, residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap water"
all produce a positive reaction. Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test," 12 J. FoRENstc Sci. 19, 23 (1967).
183. See P. GtArANE. & E. Istwunmt AiE, supra note 172, ch. 23 (drug identification); Stein, Laessig & Indriksons,
An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973
Wis. L. REv. 727, 728.
184. See 3 J. Wtsrem & M. BERGER, WENrtm's EviDEscE 703-9 (1987) ("The most controversial aspect of Rule
703 is its second sentence .. ").
See also Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAID. L. Rev. 577 (1986); Carlson, Collision
Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234 (1984);
Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L.
REv. 583 (1987).
185. Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
186. Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1984).
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that most of this information was suspect. For example, the conclusion regarding the
cause of death-recorded as gunshot wounds-was based not on an autopsy but
rather on the statement of a witness as transmitted to the coroner through the
police. 187
Second, even if a valid procedure is used, there is no way to determine, without
the testimony of the analyst, if it was properly employed at the time of the
examination. One court has noted:
Since most laboratory reports only state general conclusions, they may be given far more
significance in court than they rightfully deserve. Inquiry during examination of the chemist
may reveal the possibility of laboratory error due to the carelessness of the chemist sharing
a limited area with others and due to the large number of samples being tested. The defense
may further wish to ask what other substances were in the sample and how these would
affect a true test reaction. 188
Similarly, admission of the laboratory report may cover up gaps in the chain of
custody. The Second Circuit's concern about the chain of custody played a role in its
exclusion of the chemist's report in Oates.189
Third, information about the analyst is not reported. Only the name and position
of the examiner usually appear. Academic degrees, years of experience, specialized
training, and number of analyses performed cannot be determined. Nor can it be
assumed that all analysts are competent. An article on drug testing describes the
cross-examination of a drug expert with 43 years experience and more than 2500
court appearances as follows:
[The expert] admitted that not only did he not have a college degree, but that he had never
even finished high school. He claimed that heroin was an alkaloid, which it is, but did not
remember what an alkaloid was. He could not draw the structure of heroin or benzene, one
of the commonest and simplest organic molecules.... In addition, he could not explain any
single chemical reaction about which he had testified.' 90
In another case, an expert testified that he had a master's degree in science "whereas
in fact he never attained a graduate degree."' 19 1
In sum, there is nothing "scientific" about the way test results are typically
reported. A scientist has commented:
For a report from a crime laboratory to be deemed competent, I think most scientists would
require it to contain a minimum of three elements: (a) a description of the analytical
techniques used in the test requested by the government or other party, (b) the quantitative
or qualitative results with any appropriate qualifications concerning the degree of certainty
187. Id. at 346.
188. United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847, 848 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1982). See also United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698,
701 (7th Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion) ("Mhe defendant at trial was helpless because he had no way to determine
whether proper methods of analysis were used and were free from error in their execution.").
189. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 75 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Nothing indicates who deleted the notation, when
it was deleted, or why it was deleted and, as it relates to the issue of chain of custody, it is a matter of some importance.").
See generally Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 Am. Cans. L. REv. 527 (1983).
190. Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, supra note 183, at 728 (footnote omitted).
191. Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App. 1981). See generally Starts, Mountebanks Among
Forensic Scientists, in 2 FoeRnsiSc SciENcE HANDBOOK 2 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988).
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surrounding them, and (c) an explanation of any necessary presumptions or inferences that
were needed to reach the conclusions.192
Judged by this standard, most reports are not "competent." 193 Without such
information, it is impossible to evaluate the reported findings. In effect, the report
masks critical reliability issues. 194 Instead of a probing cross-examination of the
expert, the jury receives an "official" report, prepared by someone with "unques-
tioned" expertise.
C. Unavailability of the Analyst
The unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts presents additional difficul-
ties. While establishing the unavailability of the declarant is not a prerequisite to the
admissibility of business and public records under the hearsay rule, 19 5 Roberts states
that the Confrontation Clause "normally" requires a showing of unavailability. 196
Thus, Roberts would appear to require a laboratory analyst's testimony unless the
prosecution could establish his actual unavailability. The issue, however, is not that
simple because the Court recognized an exception in Roberts and substantially
modified the unavailability requirement in Inadi.
1. The Exception: The Utility of Cross-Examination
The exception to the unavailability requirement cited in Roberts is found in
footnote seven. It reads:
A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that
it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness. 197
Moreover, in his Dutton concurrence, Justice Harlan cited the business and public
records exceptions, including a case admitting laboratory reports, 198 as examples of
hearsay exceptions in which the production of the declarant would be "of small utility
192. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 632 (1983) (remarks of Professor
Anna Harrison, Department of Chemistry, Mount Holyoke College).
193. The reason for this paucity of information may be explained in tactical, rather than scientific, terms: "Many
criminal defense attorneys suspect that the unusual brevity of reports by FBI fingerprint or handwriting experts (e.g., often
one or two short sentences) may be partially explained by the fact that defense counsel is entitled to copies of them prior
to trial." Allis, Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of
Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. Rv. 461, 475 n.51 (1977).
194. 4 D. LousELL & C. MUELLER, FeuEDxL EvmErcE 754 (1980) ("Even reports of routine tests rest upon standards
and are subject to risks of error which are not apparent on the face of the reports themselves.").
195. Following the traditional view, the Federal Rules place the business and public records exceptions in rule 803,
which does not require a showing of the declarant's unavailability. See FED. R. EviD. 803(6), (8).
196. In an earlier case, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court wrote: "[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for
purposes of the... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain
his presence at trial." Id. at 724-25. In Roberts the Court reaffirmed this test, noting that "if there is a possibility, albeit
remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their
effectuation.... The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior
to trial to locate and present that witness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.7 (1980).
198. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
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to a defendant." 199 Nevertheless, the scope of the Roberts exception remains
unclear:2oo
Does the Court mean that a showing of unavailability is excused if the proffered . . .
statement is sufficiently reliable? Or is the Court commenting on the low probative value of
the statement in Dutton? Or is it assessing the unlikelihood that defendant would have an
interest in examining the declarant in person?201
If, for example, the utility of the declarant's presence is minimal because the
statement is reliable, the two prongs of Roberts-unavailability and reliability-are
merged.2 02 Any statement satisfying the reliability prong would automatically fall
within the exception granted by Roberts. This reading of the exception would make
the unavailability requirement meaningless.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the Roberts exception, the utility of
cross-examination in this context is demonstrated by the reliability problems
associated with scientific proof discussed earlier. 203 At trial, the expert could be
cross-examined on his qualifications, the validity of the procedures employed, his
adherence to those procedures, and the methods used to safeguard the chain of
custody, as well as other issues. 2°4 The value of this type of cross-examination is not
diminished simply because the analyst might not remember the specific examination
in question. 205 In such a case, most of these issues can still be explored. Using the
report and bench notes, the expert could testify about most of these issues.
199. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970).
200. Dutton itself left many questions unanswered. The statement at issue was made by a coconspirator and admitted
under a state rule that went beyond the traditional hearsay exception. In ruling that admission of the statement did not
violate the Confrontation Clause, the plurality opinion cited a number of factors. One court summarized these factors as
follows:
The four reliability factors discussed in Dutton... are: (1) whether the declaration contained assertions of past
fact; (2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and role of the participants in the crime;
(3) whether it was possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recollection; and (4) whether the
circumstances under which the statements were made provided reason to believe that the declarant had
misrepresented the defendant's involvement in the crime. . . . The reliability factors discussed in Dutton,
however, are not to be considered exhaustive, nor are all factors required to be present in order to admit the
declarations.... An additional factor, sometimes discussed and its relevance debated, is whether the testimony
of the coconspirator was "crucial" or "devastating."
United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982) (citations omitted). A
commentator has made the following observation about these factors:
The difficulties exhibited in the Dutton opinion in articulating these tests, the uncertain relationship of one test
to another, and the difficulties associated with applying one or all of the various tests to the facts of a given case,
each contribute to the uncertainty existing as to the relationship of the hearsay rule to the confrontation clause.
M. GRAnA, EviDEsc: Txr, RuLEs, ILLusTpATONS AND PRoBLEtS 290 (1983).
201. J. Wesrirtni, J. MANsansi, N. ABRAMS & M. BEREo, EviosrcE, CASES AND MATERIAsS 693 (1983).
202. Id. ("If inability at trial to demonstrate the unreliability of the statement is the crux of the Roberts footnote
about Dutton, what is the impact of the second prong of the Roberts test - 'reliability' . . .
203. See supra notes 148-94 and accompanying text.
204. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1977) (Defendant could have questioned the examiner
who prepared the lab report about his "personal qualifications and experience," whether tests "were correctly
performed," "whether the procedures and analyses used are recognized in the profession as being reliable," and
"whether any machines used were in good working order.").
205. According to one writer, "cross-examination would be of limited use in shedding light on the performance of
a routine test in a busy laboratory because of the unlikelihood that the analyst would have any independent recollection
of the text." Alexander, supra note 52, at 728. See also In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 523, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005
(Fam. Ct. 1975) ("It is impossible for a police laboratory chemist to recall the tests he performed and their results in an
individual narcotics case of a routine nature.").
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Moreover, in other contexts the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of trial confrontation of scientific proof. For example, in United States v.
Wade20 6 the Court extended the right to counsel to pretrial identification procedures,
in part, because the presence of counsel will "assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial .... ."2o27 The Court, however, went on to distinguish identification procedures
from scientific analyses:
The Government characterizes the lineup as a mere preparatory step in the gathering of the
prosecution's evidence, not different-for Sixth Amendment purposes-from various other
preparatory steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints,
blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like. We think there are differences which preclude
such stages from being characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the right to
the presence of his counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is
sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the
ordinary processes of cross-examination of Government's expert witnesses .... 208
Similarly, in rejecting a challenge to the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony
of future dangerousness in capital cases, the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle2 9 cited the
traditional safeguards of the adversary system, which includes cross-examination:
"We are not persuaded.., that the fact-finder and the adversary system will not be
competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of [such testimony's]
shortcomings." ' 210 Finally, in refusing to recognize a due process right to the
preservation of breath samples in California v. Trombetta,21 1 the Court commented
that "as to operator error, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the law
enforcement officer who administered the Intoxilyzer test, and to attempt to raise
doubts in the mind of the fact-finder whether the test was properly administered.' 212
Although these cases involved different constitutional issues, they have one thing in
common-the Court's explicit recognition of the value of trial confrontation of expert
testimony. 2 3 It would be difficult to reconcile these pronouncements with the notion
that cross-examination of an expert would be of "small utility."
A recent decision, Delaware v. Fensterer,214 also supports this view. In that
206. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
207. Id. at 236.
208. Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added). See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
209. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
210. Id. at 899.
211. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
212. Id. at 490.
213. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on the
insane violated the eight amendment. Part of Justice Marshall's opinion, which was joined by three other Justices, focused
on the reliability of the procedures used to determine insanity - in particular, the failure to permit cross-examination of
the opinions of psychatric experts. He wrote:
Cross-examination of the psychiatrists, or perhaps a less formal equivalent, would contribute markedly to the
process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by bringing to light the bases for each expert's beliefs, the precise
factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of the examiner, any personal bias with respect
to the issue of capital punishment, the expert's degree of certainty about his or her own conclusions, and the
precise meaning of ambiguous words used in the report.
Id. at 415.
214. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
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case, an FBI analyst testified that hair found at a murder scene had been forcibly
removed. He further testified that there were three methods available to make this
determination, but that he could not remember which method he had used to reach his
conclusion. 2 15 The Delaware Supreme Court held that his lack of memory precluded
the defense from testing the basis for the opinion by cross-examination and thus
violated the right of confrontation. 216 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The
Court's reasoning is instructive: "[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied
when the defense is given full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these
infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. ' 217 Had the
expert's findings been introduced through a laboratory report, however, there would
have been no "opportunity to probe these infirmities." Indeed, they would have gone
undisclosed.
2. United States v. Inadi
The Roberts exception is not the Court's only retreat from a strict unavailability
requirement. As noted above, the Court in Inadi modified the unavailability
requirement when ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator statements. The Court
distinguished these statements from the preliminary hearing testimony at issue in
Roberts. According to the Court, the latter is used as a substitute for trial testimony
and thus should be permitted only when the declarant is unavailable.
[F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has
independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony. If
the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the
form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the
demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version.218
In contrast, "[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other
in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand.' 219 By
the time of trial, the position of the conspirator will have changed. Facing indictment
or trial, the conspirator will have "little incentive to aid the prosecution," and thus
"it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the evidentiary
significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operating in full force. "2
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a showing of unavailability is not required when
coconspirator statements are introduced. This aspect of Inadi does not apply to the
admissibility of laboratory reports. The circumstances do not change between the
time the report is prepared and the time of trial; the analyst's relationship with the
215. Id. at 17.
216. Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. 1985).
217. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985). On remand, the Delaware Supreme Court again held the
expert's opinion inadmissible but on evidentiary rather than constitutional grounds. Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106
(Del. 1986).
218. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986).
219. Id. at 395.
220. Id.
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prosecution remains unaltered. Hence, the report is only a weaker substitute for live
testimony.
Another aspect of Inadi, however, is more problematic. In upholding the
admissibility of laboratory reports in the face of a confrontation challenge, a number
of courts have cited the defendant's failure to subpoena the analyst.2 21 For example,
in State v. Spikes 22 the court wrote that defense counsel "could have subpoenaed
[the preparers of a hospital report] to testify at trial." 22 3 Language in Inadi would
appear to support the relevance of this factor. After pointing out that the defendant
had not attempted to subpoena the coconspirator, the Court wrote:
The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the testimony of
any of these declarants. If the Government has no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant
as a witness, and if the defense has not chosen to subpoena such a declarant, ... then it is
difficult to see what, if anything, is gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to make
that declarant "available."- 224
How critical this compulsory process argument is to the Court's confrontation
analysis is difficult to evaluate. If taken to an extreme, this approach would permit
the prosecutor to use hearsay instead of live testimony in all circumstances, justifying
such conduct simply by citing the defense's failure to subpoena the declarant. 2 5 This
would, in effect, merge the confrontation and compulsory process guarantees,
leaving the accused with only the latter protection. The issue is not new. In an article
examining the relationship between the Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Clauses, Professor Westen commented:
What distinguishes a witness "against" the accused from a witness "in his favor" is not the
content of the witness' testimony but the identity of the party relying on his evidence. A
person is a witness "against" the accused if he is one whose statements the prosecution
relies upon in court in its effort to convict the accused; in order to use the statements of such
a witness, the prosecution must take the initiative in identifying and producing him at
trial.= 6
He goes on to conclude that the prosecution must call such a witness unless the
hearsay statement "is such that the defendant could not reasonably be expected to
wish to examine the declarant in person .... ,,227 Professor Graham has proposed a
different analysis, which focuses on whether the hearsay statement is accusatory at
the time it is made. "If the out-of-court statement was accusatory when made, the
declarant is a witness against the defendant. Conversely, if the out-of-court statement
was not accusatory, the declarant is not a witness against the defendant, and the
221. E.g., United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 250, 49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974); Burleson v. State, 585
S.W.2d 711, 713 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
222. 67 Ohio St. 2d 405, 423 N.E.2d 1122 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1131 (1982).
223. Id. at 411, 423 N.E.2d at 1128.
224. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
225. "Inadi's logic should lead to the conclusion that the confrontation clause allows the prosecution to produce
summaries of his evidence or exparte affidavits without calling witnesses, so long as the defense can later produce those
witnesses." Jonakait, supra note 125, at 621.
226. Westen, supra note 125, at 604 (emphasis in original). See also Lilly, supra note 125, at 231.
227. Westen, supra note 125, at 617-18.
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confrontation clause has no application.' '228 Under either standard, laboratory
examiners should be called as prosecution witnesses. Laboratory reports are
"accusatory" when made and "relied" on by the prosecution at trial. Several courts
have reached the same result, holding that the defendant's failure to call a prosecution
expert as a witness is not a waiver of the right to confront him.229
In addition, given the inadequacy of pretrial discovery, placing the burden on the
defendant to call the analyst would be unfair. Although some commentators have
argued that the defendant's discovery rights provide adequate notice of the analyst's
testimony, 230 this is simply not true. While scientific reports are generally
discoverable,2 t the report does not provide sufficient information. As discussed
earlier, it typically reveals only the results of the analysis and nothing more. 232
Discovery depositions are generally unavailable in criminal cases, 233 and thus the
necessary information cannot be obtained through that device. Consequently, the
defense may have no way of knowing what tests were used, whether the examiner
was qualified, and so forth. Issuing a subpoena for the analyst in these circumstances
would be a gamble, one which many defendants may forego. Thus, even if the report
is unreliable, there may be no meaningful opportunity to contest it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increased use of scientific proof in criminal trials, which has occurred in
recent years, will undoubtedly continue. By emphasizing the importance of "ex-
trinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation'' 2 4 and
"modem scientific methods of crime detection," s the Supreme Court has encour-
aged this development. The Court's encouragement is salutary because the expanded
use of scientific evidence will enhance the reliability of the factfinding process.
Nevertheless, scientific proof, like other methods of proof, has its weaknesses and
limitations. The routine admission of laboratory reports can be justified only if the
presumption of reliability that generally attaches to business and public records also
applies to these reports. Such a presumption is unwarranted. Accordingly, the
analyst's conclusions should not be accepted at trial untested by cross-examination.
There may, however, be a solution which would protect the defendant's
constitutional rights and yet relieve the prosecution of the burden of producing the
analyst when scientific proof is not a contested issue in the case. Several jurisdictions
228. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: The State of the
Relationship, 72 MiNN. L. Rav. 523, 593 (1988). See also Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule and the
Forgetful Witness, 56 Tax. L. REv. 151 (1978).
229. See Phillips v. Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); Gregory v.
State, 40 Md. App. 297, 328 n.28, 391 A.2d 437, 455 n.28 (1978) ("It [is] the State's burden-not that of appellant-
to produce the witnesses against him.").
230. Alexander, supra note 52, at 729.
231. E.g., FED. R. CPam. P. 16(a)(1)(D); ME. R. CRm. P. 16(b)(B); Onto R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(1)(d).
232. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
233. A majority ofjurisdictions do not permit discovery depositions in criminal cases. Instead, criminal depositions
generally are limited to preserving the testimony of a witness who may be unavailable for trial. E.g., FED. R. CsMt. P.
15(a); CoLO. R. CRsi. P. 15(a); Ky. R. CRuY. P. 7.10; Wyo. R. Cium. P. 17(a).
234. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964).
235. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
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have enacted statutes that provide for the admissibility of laboratory reports if the
defendant is served with a copy of the report and does not request the presence of the
analyst at trial.236
These notice and demand statutes offer a possible answer to the constitutional
problem. According to one court, a defendant's failure to request the analyst
constitutes a waiver of the right to confrontation.237 In Brookhart v. Janis,
238
however, the Supreme Court applied a stringent standard for waiving the right of
confrontation, requiring the prosecution to establish "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.''2 9 A notice and demand statute
would satisfy this standard only if the defendant is provided with sufficient
information to make an informed decision. This would include, in addition to a copy
of the report, information about the procedures employed in the analysis and the
qualifications of the examiner. The current discovery provisions are insufficient
because this information is typically not disclosed. If this information were provided
and the defendant were given the opportunity to depose24° or interview the analyst,
241
a failure to request the analyst's trial testimony would satisfy the constitutional waiver
standard.
Moreover, this type of provision would not appear to place an undue burden on
the prosecution. Most defendants plead guilty. In the cases that go to trial, scientific
evidence is often not a contested issue. Once the defense is satisfied that the analysis
was properly performed, there would be little incentive to call the analyst.242 If,
however, the defense demands the presence of the examiner, for whatever reason, the
sixth amendment requires the government to call him as a prosecution witness.
236. E.g., MD. CIS. & JiU. PRoc. CODE ANN. § I0-306(b) (Supp. 1987) (intoxication tests); OIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.51(B), (C) (Anderson 1987) (controlled substances). See State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App. 2d 278, 382 N.E.2d 1193
(1978) (failure to serve copy of lab report on defendant renders report inadmissible).
See also IowA CODE ANN. § 691.2 (West Supp. 1988) (lab report admissible unless defendant requests analyst to
"testify in person"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1112(1) (1983) (lab report admissible unless defendant requests
witness' testimony).
237. E.g., State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); State v.
Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Iowa 1975).
238. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
239. Id. at 4 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). In other confrontation cases, however, the
Court has found a waiver by conduct. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (waiver of right to be present where
defendant flees after commencement of trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (waiver of right to be present where
defendant disrupts trial). These cases have led one commentator to suggest that a forfeiture, rather than waiver, theory
is a more accurate description of the Court's decisions. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule:
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Cria. L. BuLL. 99, 141 (1972).
240. Although discovery depositions are generally not permitted in criminal cases, this proposal would not be a
radical departure from existing practice. For example, FED. R. EviD. 706(a) provides that the deposition of
court-appointed experts "may be taken by any party."
241. One study suggests that this proposal would not present major problems. M. SAgs & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE
OF Scmrmc EVIDENCE LmGAT[oN 38 (1983) ("The [prosecution] experts we spoke with said they were willing and
available to meet with defense counsel and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the scientific evidence but such
meetings rarely occurred.").
242. A survey of crime laboratories showed that analysts, on the whole, testify infrequently. "It was reported that
on the average, crime laboratory examiners testified in 8% of drug cases (the percentage ranged from 0 to 86%) and 10%
of criminalistics cases (the percentage ranged from 0 to 87%) where evidence was examined." Peterson, Mihajlovic &
Bedrosian, supra note 94, at 15.

